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When the star rose from the mud of the earth
the gods laughed with secret mirth
at the latent defects of her birth.'
I. ITr=ODUCTION
The ancient astrologer constructed his own heavens from an
anthropomorphic vision composed of superstitious myth, atavistic
fears, religious belief and the half-light of dawning science. The
diplomats who gathered in Washington in July and August, 1964,
began to construct their own heaven in the form of a global com-
munication satellite system in a far more enlightened fashion,
but the wedding of modern science and diplomacy which took
place there still showed traces of the astrologers' ancient com-
ponents. It is the purpose of this article to identify those traces
and determine whether they should grow more or less prominent.
In pursuing this purpose, we will consider the nature of the
resource involved (the radio-telephone frequency spectrum) and
an analysis of the Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements
for a Global Commercial Communication Satellite System, the
Supplemental Agreement, 2 and the United States Communica-
tions Satellite Act.3 This analysis will be largely concerned with
a consideration of the participation structure created by the
agreements and the act in order to assess the compatability of
the system with the objectives announced by its creators. The
analysis will be conducted in the context of both immediate and
long range situations.
The radio-telephone frequency spectrum not only permits in-
ternational sharing of its benefits, but also literally demands such
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; B.A.,
Emory University; LL.B., Emory University; LL.M., Yale University.
1. "Satellite Satire," by James L. Underwood.
2. Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial
Communications Satellite System, and Special Agreement, August 19, 1964,
T.I.A.S. No. 5646. (The first of the agreements will be referred to in text as
the Interim Agreement and hereinafter cited as 1964 Interim Agreement,
T.I.A.S. No. 5646.)
3. 76 Stat. 419 (1962), 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1964) (hereinafter cited by sec-
tions of the Act and the U.S. Statutes).
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sharing.4 It is not a resource that stops at national boundaries.
It is not, like a river, a resourse around which national bound-
aries can be drawn. Its most important characteristic is that it
is a limited resource. Like the soil, our capacity for utilizing it
increases with the development of modern science, but it is not
infinitely expandable. Not only is the spectrum a limited re-
source; it is somewhat uniformly distributed throughout the
globe. It can not, like coal or iron or food stuffs, be mined or
grown at the point of greatest supply and shipped to the point of
greatest need. The limited nature of the spectrum, and its uni-
form distribution exercise a pervasive influence over the legal
and political problems involved in creating a communications
satellite system.
First to be examined are the announced objectives of the par-
ties to the Interim Agreement in relation to the problems of
participation. The preamble to the Interim Agreement states
that the agreement is entered into "recalling the principles set
forth in Resolution No. 1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly
of the United Nations that communications by means of satel-
lites be available to the nations of the world as soon as prac-
ticable on a global and non-discriminatory basis;" and "be-
lieving that satellite communications should be organized in
such a way as to permit all states to have access to the global
system and those states so wishing to invest in the system with
consequent participation in the design, development, construction
(including the provision of equipment), establishment, main-
tenance, operation and ownership of the system. . .. ", The
United States Communications Satellite Act expresses its objec-
tives in similar but more general terms. It speaks of providing
services to underdeveloped as well as developed parts of the
world.6 It does not specifically enumerate areas of participation
on the part of countries other than those provided with services;
however, nothing inconsistent with participation by other nations
in additional activities is included in the opening sections of the
act.
In considering the compatibility of the scheme of participation
devised by the agreements and the act with the objectives just
mentioned, the problem of participation may be broken down
4. ITU, FRom SEMAPHORE TO SATELLITE 247 (1965).
5. 1964 Interim Agreement, T.I.A.S. No. 5646.
6. Communications Satellite Act, § 102(b), 76 Stat. 419 (1962), 47 U.S.C.
§ 701(b) (1964).
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss5/4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIW
in the following manner: (1) Who should participate; (2) the
areas in which the various participants should be active, and
(3) the relative degree of participation of the various nations
and entities involved.
II. WHO SHOULD PARTICIPATE
A. The United States' Representative: Too Many Voices
The problem of who should participate not only involves which
nations should participate, but also involves the nature of the
representative of a particular participant. The most important
case in point is the United States. A violent, sometimes acrimon-
ious, dispute arose as to whether the United States representa-
tive should be a private, public, or mixed entity.7 In its refine-
ments the dispute concerned whether a private entity, if chosen,
should be a corporation whose stock is widely held or one whose
stock and policy is controlled by the communications giants,
such as the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(A.T.&T.) . If a public or a mixed entity were chosen, should it
be a new extension of the President's traditional control over the
nation's foreign policy or should it be considered an organization-
al means of utilizing a new development in communications or
space technology? This involves the question of whether it is a
fit subject for the traditional communications expertise of the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an independent
regulatory agency, or the newer expertise of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA), an agency under
the direct control of the President. If the military aspects of the
system were expected to be predominant, perhaps the executive
should be given control through a defense agency.
These disputes were ostensibly settled by the passage of the
Communications Satellite Corporation Act which created a so-
called mixed public-private corporation to serve as the United
States' agent in the establishment and operation of a global com-
munication satellite system. 9 While apparently quelling the im-
mediate conflict, the legislation increased the potential for con-
flict. The United States' representation was divided in a be-
7. See, e.g., 108 CoNG. REc. 15029 (1962) (remarks of Senator Morse).
8. For a discussion of public versus a private entity see Klein, Goldsen
et al., Communications Satellites and Public Policy: An Introductory Report,
Rand Corp. Memorandum, RM-2925 NASA (Dec. 1962).
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wildering fashion among the various contending groups dis-
cussed above. The resulting potential for conflict is somewhat
similar to that created by a peace conference that divides a na-
tion's territory into splinter elements: the necessity to reunite
,n order to create a viable entity can lead to a struggle for domi-
nation by the splinter units. The act raises serious questions as to
who should be and who, in fact, is conducting the foreign policy
of the United States in relation to communications satellites. At
present neither the United States itself nor foreign governments
or communications entities can know entirely who is dealing with
whom and with what authority.
When the Communications Satellite Corporation is conducting
"business negotiations" with foreign governments or communica-
tions entities, it is merely required by section 402 of the act to
"notify" the State Department of the negotiations so that it can
"advise the corporation of the relevant foreign policy consider-
ations."'" The corporation may request, but is not required to
accept, the assistance of the State Department in conducting the
negotiations.'- So in foreign business negotiations, the State
Department is either a mere observer or exercises a function
secondary to that of the corporation. But it may be argued that
this is no worse than the situation which occurs when other cor-
porations conduct business negotiations with foreign govern-
ments or corporations. In fact, it is somewhat better than rela-
tions with some other corporations because of the statutory re-
quirement that the State Department be kept informed. How-
ever, such arguments fail to consider that in the eyes of foreign
governments or communications entities, any activities in the
space development field by a corporation created by Congress
must necessarily be an expression of United States governmental
policy. The reasons for such an attitude are not hard to under-
stand. The amazing surge of United States activity in space
development since the 195*7 Russian Sputnik launching has been
entirely under careful governmental direction. Other countries
may find it hard to believe that the United States government is
relinquishing any portion of its control over space activities.
This is particularly so in the light of the enormous national
prestige attached to success in space activities.
10. 76 Stat. 426 (1962), 47 U.S.C. § 742 (1964).
11. 76 Stat 426 (1962), 47 U.S.C. § 742 (1964).
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The situation is drastically altered when one considers section
402 in relation to section 201(a) (4),12 dealing with the powers
and duties of the President of the United States under the act.
The President's powers as described in the latter section are
susceptible to interpretations which either completely abolish
the corporation's powers to conduct foreign negotiations inde-
pendently of the government or pose a direct conflict between
the government's powers and those of the corporation. At the
very least this situation poses very difficult problems of inter-
pretation. Section 201(a) (4) states that the President shall
"exercise such supervision over relationships of the corporation
with foreign governments or entities or with international bodies
as may be appropriate to assure that such relationships shall be
consistent with the national interest and foreign policy of the
United States." The act may be interpreted as creating two cate-
gories of activities by the corporation in relation to foreign gov-
ernments or communications entities: those described as "business
negotiations" and another category, referred to in section 201 (a)
(4), of indeterminate content consisting of all other international
activities of the corporation. The term "business negotiations"
is not defined. No standards of interpretation and no authorita-
tive decision-makers have been designated by the act to determine
which category contains a particular activity.
Another possible interpretation of the two sections is that two
categories are not created at all, but that the President, under
201(a) (4) may, when he deems it desirable in the national in-
terest, assume control of any activity of the corporation which
relates to foreign entities or governments, including business
negotiations. In view of this possible interpretation, foreign
negotiators might hesitate to negotiate with Comsat in view of
the possibility of discretionary presidential intervention. Similar
hesitancy could be created by section 201(c) (3),13 under which
the Secretary of State may require the corporation to establish
communications by satellites and ground station links with a
particular foreign point when the Secretary of State considers it
to be necessary in the "national interest." This provision could
conceivably permit the Secretary to intervene in negotiations in
which the corporation was attempting to determine which of sev-
eral foreign localities should be linked with its facilities.
12. 76 Stat. 421 (1962), 47 U.S.C. § 721(a) (4) (1964).
13. 76 Stat. 422 (1962), 47 U.S.C. § 21(c)(3) (1964).
[Vol. 18
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What is so far merely a picture of confusion and contradiction
grows bizarre when we consider the above listed powers given to
the national executive as they affect the Interim and Special
Agreements dealing with the Global Communications Satellite
System. Under those agreements the corporation is not merely the
United States' representative in the system, but also the managing
agent of the international consortium of nations sponsoring the
Global Communications Satellite System. 14 In this capacity the
corporation must be considered a somewhat internationalized
body. It is not entirely compatable with this international nature
of the corporation to permit even the latent existence of a power
in the President to supervise the foreign relations activities of
the corporation in order to make them consistent with United
States' national interest and foreign policy. It should be recalled
that the objective announced in the preamble to the Interim
Agreement was not predominantly the service of the United
States' national interest or foreign policy, but an orderly and
non-discriminatory sharing of the radio-telephone frequency
spectrum. The possible inconsistency of the act with the position
of the corporation as managing agent of the international con-
sortium is heightened by section 201(c) (3)15 which gives the
Secretary of State power to direct the corporation to establish
communications by satellite and ground stations with particular
foreign points when the Secretary deems it necessary.
Perhaps the most uncharacteristic role played by any of the
participants designated by the act is that of the federal courts
which could well find themselves decision-makers in the foreign
relations field. Section 403 of the act provides that if the cor-
poration by its conduct obstructs the realization of the purposes
of the act, (which would include the multitude of foreign con-
tacts necessary to establish global coverage), the Attorney Gen-
eral may seek equitable relief in the federal district court for
the district wherein the corporation "resides." The act does not
limit jurisdiction of the federal courts to provide such relief to
predominantly domestic matters, such as non-discriminatory ac-
cess by American communications common carriers to the sys-
tem as users. The section could be interpreted as being the sole
sanction that could be used by the President, under section 201,
to supervise the activities of the corporation in order to maintain
their consistency with American foreign policy and national in-
14. 1964 Interim Agreement art. VIII, T.I.A.S. 5646.
15. 76 Stat. 422 (1962), 47 U.S.C. § 721(c) (3) (1964).
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terest.16 If this is the exclusive sanction, the hands of the execu-
tive are severely tied in an area where rapid action may on oc-
casion be necessary. Even if it is not the exclusive route, section
403 still may require federal courts to make delicate foreign
policy decisions for which they have neither the experience nor
the overall knowledge. A hypothetical situation will illustrate
how this might occur. Suppose the State Department is negotiat-
ing a military alliance or trade agreement with country A. Dur-
ing the course of the negotiations, Comsat announces that it will
cease awarding satellite equipment contracts to manufacturers in
country A as their equipment is too costly and cannot meet the
new technical standards adopted by the international consortium
under the Interim Agreement. The President of the United
States then informs the corporation that its policy is inconsistent
with the foreign policy of the United States as it might upset the
delicate negotiations with country A. The President directs the
corporation to cease pursuing such a policy. The corporation re-
plies that it is acting pursuant to directions of the international
consortium, that the President has no authority to countermand
these directions, that forcing the corporation to place such costly
orders would constitute an unconstitutional taking of property
by the President, and in sum, that the foreign policy interest
of the United States are best served by permitting the corpor-
ation to follow the directions of the international consortium and
by providing a technically better and more inexpensive system.
The President then directs the Attorney General to go into the
federal district court in Washington, D. C., and request equitablr
relief compelling the corporation to cease its announced policy
Assuming that section 403 permits the court to reach the merits
the court must determine not only the relative responsibility of
the corporation to the international consortium and the President.
and the unconstitutional taking issue but also the consistency of
the corporations action with United States foreign policy.
To the already overcrowded collection of participants in the
direction of United States interest in the Global Communications
Satellite System must be added the FCC, a body which has not
previously played an active role in foreign affairs. The FCC's
powers in this field are given added weight by the fact that it is
an independent agency not directly under the control of the
16. Communications Satellite Act § 201(a), 76 Stat. 421 (1962), 47 U.S.C.
§ 721(a) (1964); Communications Satellite Act § 403, 76 Stat. 426 (1962),
47 U.S.C. § 743(a) (1964).
[Vol. 18
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President.17 While many of the powers given the FCC under
the act are in the same tradition as the powers it normally exer-
cises over domestic common carriers, they take on unusual sig-
nificance in light of the fact that the subject of these powers,
Comsat, is not merely a domestic carrier, but also the managing
agent of an international consortium. Most of the decisions the
FCC makes under the act would have to be made by some group
in the United States government. The question is, is it the most
appropriate body to make them?
Let us consider some of the FCC's powers and how they might
affect foreign relations. Under Article V of the Interim Agree-
ment the international committee created by the agreement has
the power to approve the technical standards for the satellite
system and terminal stations.' 8 The Communications Satellite
Act (see section 201(c) (4)) gives this power to the FCC. This
means that the FCC must be included in the majority of negotia-
tions with foreign countries or communications entities. A glance
at the FCC's Annual Report for 1964 indicates that it has been
so included. 19 This sliver of power given to the FCC, an inde-
pendent regulatory agency, means that theoretically at least the
other members of the United States negotiating team might be
willing to agree to one set of characteristics while the FCC could
continue to insist on another. Since it has control over this area
within the United States, the predominant power on the inter-
national committee, it follows that the FCC could completely
block international agreement in this area. It is not likely to do
so, but the possibility remains none the less. While the expertise
of the FCC might be needed in making decisions in these areas,
it seems more desirable that the FCC act in a purely advisory
capacity to the State Department and the corporation. Perhaps
NASA, an agency more susceptible to executive direction, should
have the duty of evaluating the technical standards as far as the
United States is concerned.
Many of the other powers held by the FCC in relation to com-
munications satellite activities are concerned with its power over
the access of domestic communications carriers to the system.
One aspect of this power is its determination of whether Ameri-
can based ground stations shall be constructed and owned by
17. The President's lack of direct control over independent regulatory agen-
cies is demonstrated by Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935).
18. 1964 Interim Agreement T.I.A.S. No. 5646.
19. 1964 F.C.C. ANN. REP. 41-50.
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Comsat or by communications common carriers such as A.T.&T. 20
These decisions will determine whether Comsat or a communica-
tions common carrier will be most directly concerned with negoti-
ating with foreign users of a particular ground station. In addi-
tion, the FCC has the power to allocate opportunities for owning
Comsat stock among various common carriers in order to assure
an equitable distribution of ownership.21 While determination of
these matters requires foreign policy judgment, adjudicative
skills-such as those the FCC has traditionally been charged with
using-are equally needed. However, an added international di-
mension must be added to the usual criteria of public and nation-
al interest in making decisions concerning Comsat because of its
role as managing agent of the international consortium.
Much of the importance of the FCC activities in the communi-
cations satellite field can only be realized in light of the vast
technical lead of the United States over the other members of the
consortium. Because of this fact many of the decisions reached
by the consortium must then clear the FCC as a second authorit-
ative decision-maker. A recent case in point is the decision of the
Interim Committee of the consortium to purchase four satellites.
Since only United States corporations were capable of fulfilling
the need, the approval of the purchase came squarely within the
jurisdiction of the FCC under section 201(c) (9) of the Communi-
cation Satellite Act to approve or disapprove additions to the
communications satellite system.22 It would be better if this
virtual veto power were exercised by a special agency or panel,
more responsive to foreign policy determinations by the execu-
tive, rather than trying to pour these decisions concerning a
delicate new area into the traditional role of the FCC.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is a par-
ticipating United States agency that is growing in importance.
Recently Comsat announced that the International Consortium
had agreed to provide NASA with four communications satellites
and three mobile ground stations for use in the Apollo moon shot
program.23 The same satellites and stations will be used to pro-
vide commercial service by the consortium throughout the Pacific
20. See Communications Satellite Act § 201(c) (7), 76 Stat. 422 (1962), 47
U.S.C. § 721(c)(7) (1964).
21. See Communications Satellite Act § 304(b) (2), (f), 76 Stat. 424-25
(1962), 47 U.S.C. § 734(b) (2), (f) (1964).
22. Communications Satellite Corp. News Release, p. 2, Oct. 25, 1965.
23. Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1965, p. 8, col 4.
[Vol. 18
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area.2 4 This could be looked at not only as Americanization of the
commercial system, but also as an internationalization of the
American manned-spacecraft program. Certainly NASA could
have obtained the satellite and ground station services directly
from United States sources without going through the interna-
tional consortium; therefore, NASA's action can be interpreted as
a deliberate inclusion of the international consortium as a par-
ticipant in activities concerning a sharable resource. However,
the action does raise some problems. The American manned-
spacecraft program is looked upon in the eyes of world public
opinion as partly a military project and partly as an element in
the prestige race with the Soviet Union. A close link between
the United States manned-spacecraft program and the global
commercial satellite program partly deprives the latter of its
image as a project designed to provide equal and peaceful use of
the radio-telephone frequency spectrum by countries throughout
the world. This change in character is less so in actuality than
it may be made to appear by Soviet propaganda. This could be
decisive in causing some of the so-called neutral or nonaligned
countries not to participate in the system.
United States governmental participation in the global com-
munications satellite system is, structurally at least, a confusing
tangle of stray appendages of power. The internal power struc-
ture of the Communications Satellite Corporation also draws its
participants from a variety of sources. The corporation has a
board composed of fifteen United States citizens, three of whom
are appointed by the President of the United States, six of -whom
are selected by the common carrier stockholders, and six whom
are selected by all other stockholders. 25 Fifty per cent of the stock
is reserved for purchase by common carriers authorized by the
FCC.26 The FCC is charged with effecting the widest possible
distribution among common carriers.2 7 No stock owner other
than a common carrier can own more than ten per cent of the
voting stock.28 No more than twenty per cent of the voting stock
24. Communications Satellite Corp. News Release, p. 1, Nov. 2, 1965.
25. See Communications Satellite Act § 303(a), 76 Stat. 423-24 (1962), 47
U.S.C. § 733(a) (1964).
26. See Communications Satellite Act § 304(b) (2), 76 Stat. 424 (1962), 47
U.S.C. § 734(b)(2) (1964).
27. See Communications Satellite Act § 304(f), 76 Stat 424 (1962), 47
U.S.C. § 734(f) (1964).
28. See Communications Satellite Act § 304(b) (3), 76 Stat 424 (1962), 47
U.S.C. § 734(b)(3) (1964).
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can be owned by non-United States citizens.29 Several aspects of
this distribution should be singled out for consideration. First of
all, while foreign stock ownership is limited to twenty per cent,
such holdings could be very powerful if concentrated in a few
persons or groups. This power could be increased by combina-
tion with other categories of stockholders. This raises the specter
of the United States' representative in the global communications
satellite system receiving a large measure of direction from for-
eign sources. Foreign participation in the system should not be-
gin at the level of United States representative but at the latter
level of the international consortium. Not only is foreign par-
ticipation inappropriate at the United States representative level
because of its effect on the direction of United States foreign
policy, but also because there are no provisions requiring any
sort of equitable distribution of such foreign participation among
citizens of a variety of foreign countries. Another aspect deserv-
ing note is that there is no specific limitation placed on the
amount of stock that can be held by any one common carrier
within the fifty per cent allocated to common carriers, but there
is a limit of ten per cent on any one non-common carrier stock-
holder.8 0 As to common carriers there is only a vague general
direction to the FCC to achieve an equitable distribution.3' This
has left the United States open to the traditional Soviet criticism
that its space efforts are merely projects of our large corpor-
ations. A typical Soviet comment is that of G. S. Stashevskug
who, in regard to United States activity in the consortium, stated
that:
[A]n activity of the United States government in the field
of communications in recent years, both within the country
and in the international arena, has been devoted to the ful-
fillment of the order of big American monopolies and pri-
marily the group of monopolies headed by the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company which control the means
of communication and the production of radio-electronic
equipment. 2
29. See Communications Satellite Act § 304(d), 76 Stat. 425 (1962), 47
U.S.C. § 734(d) (1964).
30. See Communications Satellite Act § 304(b) (2) (3), 76 Stat. 424 (1962),
47 U.S.C. § 734(b) (2) (3) (1964).
31. Communications Satellite Act § 304(f), 76 Stat. 424 (1962), 47 U.S.C.
§ 734(f) (1964).
32. Stashevskug, Communication, Satellites and International Law, 12
SovIETsxoYE GoSURDARSTUVE 56-66 (1964).
[Vol. 18
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The distribution of decision-making power among a wide
variety of poorly coordinated public and private bodies created
a great potential for conflict among those bodies. Have any such
conflicts actually occurred? The wide and confusing dispersal
of the power to determine United States' policy concerning com-
mercial communications satellites has already generated a bitter
jurisdictional dispute. The dispute involves two issues: (1) Does
the FCC have the power to determine from whom the Defense
Department can obtain commercial communications satellite ser-
vice? (2) Can Comsat provide such services directly to the De-
fense Department, or must it provide them through communi-
cations common carriers such as A.T.&T. or I.T.&T.? The FCC
recently stated that the Defense Department could not obtain
satellite services directly from Comsat but must lease services
from common carriers.
The Defense Department decided to ignore the FCC decision
and claimed that the FCC did not have the power to determine
from whom it could obtain services. The common carriers pro-
tested the Defense Department decision since they did not wel-
come competition from Comsat, an organization which they
helped create and in which they had large stockholdings.3" This
controversy could create the impression in the other member
states of the international consortium that since the United States
cannot determine its own policy it is not fit to exercise leadership
in the consortium. However, the implications of the dispute go
far beyond the communications satellite field and involve the
principles underlying the allocation of power. When an attempt
is made to accommodate so many interest groups by giving each
a share of power, the result may be that no one group possesses
sufficient power to make a firm decision. It is possible that a
mixed public-private organizational structure will become the
norm for new industries generated by scientific developments
that have military and foreign policy overtones. If so, the ex-
perience in the communications satellite field indicates that built-
in confusion results from the creation of too many autonomous
sources of control.
B. The International Telecommunications Union
Having concluded our discussion of the multi-faceted United
States representation in the global communication satellite sys-
33. See N.Y. Times, July 11, 1966, p. 41, col. 6; Wall St. J., July 8, 1966,
p. 3, cols. 2 and 3; Wall St. J., July 7, 1966, p. 2, cols. 3-4.
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tem, we should now consider other categories of participants,
specifically, international organizations and other nation-states.
One of the elder statesmen among existing international organi-
zations is the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
which traces its history through predecessor organizations back
to the most primitive attempts to communicate electronically
across national boundaries. 4 In order to understand the role it
does play now and could play in the future, reference should be
made to the role it has played in the past. Its historical and
current role may be analogized to that of a policeman assigned
to a street intersection under a set of instructions which state
that he may indicate to motorists the direction in which they
must legally travel in order to avoid hitting one another, but
that if they violate these legal requirements then all he can do
is stand on the street corner and cry foul. Assume further that
the role has been a useful one in the past because the traffic has
been relatively light, the alternate routes many, and most motor-
ists have had the good sense to know one could not successfully
traverse the intersection without following the directions of the
policemen. In concrete terms, the ITU's role has been to insure
that the radio-telephone frequency spectrum is a shared resource.
International conferences, consisting of the entire membership
of the union (which is roughly the same as that of the United
Nations)3 r5 allocate frequencies among various categories of uses
such as communications satellites, radio-astronomy, ete.3 6 No
frequency assignments are made to particular users; this is left
to the individual country. Each new user must register his fre-
quency and a description of his station with the ITU's Interna-
tional Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) .3 In case of
interference by one station with another, the IFRB determines
which user was the prior registered user.38 The Union is of the
opinion that both registration and priority are prerequisites for
legal use.30 This application is similar to the land law theories
of squatters' rights and race-notice title registration. The union
34. ITU, FROM SEMAPHORE TO SATELLITE (1965).
35. Simsarian, Interim Agreement Establishing a Commercial Communica-
lions Satellite Systen, 59 Am. J. INT'L L. 344, 345 n. 7 (1965).
36. See International Telecommunications Union, Final Acts of the Extra-
ordinary Administrative Radio Conference to Allocate Frequency Bands for
Space Radiocoinnunications Purpose (Geneva 1963).
37. Telecommunications Convention and Final Protocol, Dec. 21, 1959,
T.I.A.S. No. 4892.
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has no machinery for enforcing either the frequency allocations
or IFRB decisions.
Historically, the Union has applied its regulatory functions to
a particular new method of electronic communications only
after the method has been in use for a number of years. But
with the introduction of communications satellites as a method
of international communications, the Union, for the first time,
began to perform its regulatory functions prospectively, almost
from the inception of the new system of communications. This
greatly strengthens the possibilities of the Union as an interna-
tional rule-making body. In 1963, shortly after the passage of
the Communications Satellite Act by the United States, and
shortly before the conference which organized the International
Consortium for communications satellite development, the Union
held an Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference which
resulted in the allocation of frequencies for communications sat-
ellite use; some frequencies exclusively, others on a shared basis
with other uses.40 Those attending the conference, including the
United States delegation, apparently considered such an alloca-
tion a prerequisite to the operation of a global communications
satellite system.41 Before making certain proposals concerning
the future role of the Union, one other feature of its organization
should be mentioned: the arbitration provisions found in its
charter. These provisions deal with the arbitration of disputes
concerning the interference by one country with the telecom-
munications operations of another.42 The provisions are of the
most primitive sort, containing no machinery for compulsory
submission of disputes to arbitration, but merely a method for
selecting arbitrators. However, the provisions do represent a
start.
Against this background the vague shapes of a significant new
role for the Union are beginning to take on more definite dimen-
sions. Three questions should now be discussed: (1) Should the
global communications satellite system have been organized as
a project of the Union; (2) should the system become a Union
project in the future; (3) should the regulatory function of the
Union increase in the future? The answer should probably be no
to the first two questions and yes to the third.
40. International Telecommunications Union, supra note 36.
41. See remarks of Assistant Secretary of State Griffin Johnson quoted by
Congressman Harris, 110 CoNG. REc. 176 (1964).
42. See Telecommunications Convention and Final Protocol, Dec. 21, 1959,
annex 4 T.LA.S. No. 4892.
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The Union has traditionally been, or at least has aspired to be,
an international law-making and regulatory body. The global
communications satellite system demands operation by an enter-
prisory organization. An enterprisory organization is designed
to accomplish a specific purpose; as narrowly defined as pos-
sible.4 3 It is composed only of parties definitely interested in
the accomplishment of this project. The ITU on the other hand
is a multi-purpose organization concerned with the entire range
of problems relating to all forms of telecommunications. The
ITU has not been accustomed to carrying on business operations
itself but to umpiring business operations conducted by other
organizations. In sum, there are three differences which
distinguish the organizational needs of the global communica-
tions satellite system from the nature of the Union: purpose,
method and membership. As to the last point, membership, it
should be noted that at present less than half of the members of
the ITU are members of the satellite system consortium although
under the terms of the Interim Agreement of the consortium any
member of the ITU is free to join.44 If the consortium member-
ship were initially as wide as that of the ITU, it might have been
impossible to obtain from such a numerous and various member-
ship the specificity of agreement necessary to begin the system.
We at least have the beginnings of a system which, though it
does not have a universal membership, at least has a widely inter-
national one. It should be noted once again that the membership
of the ITU was able to agree on the allocation of frequencies
among categories of use, and this is an important indication of
its future role. It may be possible in the future to add real
enforcement power to the frequency allocation and registration
functions of the Union.
In many areas of activity, enforcement power in an interna-
tional organization would probably be an unattainable goal of
optimum world order rather than a necessity for minimum world
order. For the immediate future this is probably true of the
43. McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE,
ch. 8 (1963).
44. See 1964 Interim Agreement art. XII (a) (II), T.I.A.S. No. 5646. Sim-
sarian in 59 ALr. J. INT'L L. 344 nn. 4 & 5 (1965) states that the membership
of the consortium includes Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Vatican City, Algeria,
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Ceylon, Chile, China, Columbia, Ethiopia,
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia,
United Arab Republic, and Uruguay.
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telecommunications field in general and the communications
satellite field in particular. But unlike many areas of activity,
the telecommunications field is concerned with a finite resource
in an area of growing importance: international communica-
tions. The capabilities of using the spectrum have been increased
recently by the development of communications satellites. So
there will be no impetus of immediate necessity to add enforce-
ment power, but the new technical developments could not in-
crease the spectrum itself, and someday that necessity will arise.
This necessity will mean that before anyone can use the spec-
trum beneficially, tight policing will be a must. When that time
arrives arbitration in interference cases will have to become
compulsory rather than permissive. In addition to merely regis-
tering frequencies selected by users themselves or their nation-
states on a "first come first serve" basis within broad categories
of allocation, the Union will have to establish, or at least recom-
mend, a system of use priorities based on the importance of the
use. This is not a prophesy of the millennium of world govern-
ment of the utopian dreamer, but only a modest step in a very
narrow, but important, field.
0. The United Nations
Specialized international bodies such as the ITU and the
satellite consortium are able, to some extent, to compartmentalize
areas of dispute and interaction between nations. In other words,
in the context of such organizations, nations are able to address
themselves to particular areas of dispute without bringing into
play every dispute arising from every point of contact between
those nations. Specialized international bodies can not com-
pletely isolate their own areas of concern and consider them in
a sealed test tube, but some degree of compartmentalization is fre-
quently possible. On the other hand, multi-purposed internation-
al bodies, which also have a broad membership base, sometimes
tend to become a potpourri of international disputes involving
the members. To some extent this is true of the United Nations,
which, while it has a membership roughly the same as the ITU,
unlike the ITU, has very broad objectives, i.e., the peace,
economic, medical and cultural well-being of the entire world.
The broad objectives and broad membership of the United Na-
tions determine the nature of its participation in the conception
and operation of a global communications satellite system. Be-
cause of the nature of its objectives and membership, the United
16
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Nations has played a uniquely limited but uniquely valuable
role. To organize the communications satellite system directly
under the control of the United Nations, would be to cause the
system to fall heir to the difficulties the United Nations is
having in other areas. For example periods of inactivity in the
United Nations such as that which recently resulted from the
non-payment of dues by some members could have caused serious
delay in the organization and operation of the communications
satellite system. On the other hand, the broad objectives and
membership of the United Nations, have given it a prescriptive
role on the highest constitutive level. This role takes the form
of such pronouncements as General Assembly Resolutions 1721,
1802 and 1962, which respectively call for non-discriminatory
access to the communications satellites and for state supervision
of non-government agencies active in the communications satel-
lite area.45 This article will not enter the dispute as to whether
or not the resolutions constitute international law. It is suffi-
cient to say that the nations organizing the global communica-
tions satellite system reacted to the resolutions as if they were
law, i.e., to some extent they conformed their activities to the
dictates of the resolutions. How much more needs to be done to
comply further with the resolutions can be seen below in the
discussions on areas and degrees of participation. At any rate, the
Interim Agreement of the consortium and Communications Satel-
lite Act did express in their initial paragraphs the sentiment of
Resolution 1721 and did make some definite movements toward
compliance. While state control of the Communications Satellite
Corporation is at times tenuous and confused, Resolution 1962
is complied with in spirit in that no corporation will be per-
mitted to exploit a technical lead as the Marconi Company at-
tempted to do in the early days of the wireless. 46 The influence of
the resolutions on the Interim Agreement of the consortium and
the Communications Satellite Act may, in part, be attributable
to the unusual clarity and unanimity with which they express
world public opinion.
Not only does Resolution 1721 indicate participation by the
United Nations as a prescriptive body but also as a user of the
communications satellite system. The resolution states that the
45. Res. 1721 (XVI), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17
(Doc. A/5100) pp. 6-7 (1961); Res. 1802 (XVII), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC.
17th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (A/5217) p. 5 (1962); Res. 1962 (XVIII), U.N.
GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15 (A/5515) p. 15 (1963).
46. ITU, FRou SEUAPHORE TO SATnLLrTE 133 (1965).
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"principle organs and specialized agencies" of the United Nations
will find communications by satellite useful "for both operation-
al and informational requirements." 47 The resolution does not
spell out the details of such use, but a number of significant and
perhaps even vital possibilities present themselves. In recent
years the ability to disrupt peace by military attack has far
outstripped the speed -with which peacemaking mechanisms can
act. A comprehensive communications satellite system could pro-
vide some degree of correction for this imbalance. Perhaps in
the future when the United Nations dispatches a fact-finding
group to a potential war area, evaluation by the United Nations
of information the group collects need not await the return of the
group and need not be based on uninformative telegraph mes-
sages. Coverage of the fact-finding mission by special television
circuits leased by the United Nations could improve the quality
and reliability of the information and speed its evaluation. An
added result might be to widen participation in the fact-finding
function beyond that of a mere committee. This may or may not
be desirable.
We have considered the problem of who among the interna-
tional organizations of the world and who among the agencies,
public or private, of a particular nation-state, the United States,
should participate in the global commercial communications
satellite system. We should now consider the nature of the par-
ticipation of the nation-states which are members of the inter-
national consortium.
III. Tam COMPARATIVE POWER AND BENEITS OF THE
MEMBER STATES
The nature of the participation of the member-states will be
discussed first as it concerns the degree of participation and
then as it concerns the areas of participation. By degree of par-
ticipation is meant the voting power of the participating state
in the decision-making process of the consortium and the amount
of satellite use or financial benefit received by the participant
from the system. By areas of participation is meant the par-
ticular issues as to which the decision-making process of the
consortium operates and the fields of activity from which a par-
ticipant may expect to derive benefit.
Among the areas of participation are: (1) participation in the
research, development and supply of equipment for the system;
47. Res. 1721 supra note 45.
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(2) participation in the making of scientific, economic and
political decisions such as (a) which ground stations should be
permitted to utilize the space segment, and (b) rate determination
for the space segment and for ground stations; (3) participation
as the nation in which a ground station is located; and (4) par-
ticipation as a mere user of the system by a nation which is a
non-member of the consortium and which, therefore, does not
take part in the decision-making process.
A common thread which determines the degree of participa-
tion in every area mentioned is the quota of each member state.48
This quota is determined by the amount of financial contribution
required from each member state by the agreement. 49 The initial
quotas of the nineteen original signatories to the agreements are
set forth in an annex to the agreements. In addition to the
United States the original signatories were largely Western Euro-
pean nations.8 0 The quotas of the original signatories are re-
duced with the admission of each new member who is assigned
a quota. However, Article XII provides that under no circum-
stances can the combined totals of the members who were not
original signatories exceed seventeen per cent. One of the results
of this arrangement is that no matter how many additional states
come in, the United States quota or voting power can never be
lower than 50.63 per cent. Under the voting requirements system,
the United States can block any action, but it can not alone cause
passage of a particular proposal.8 ' This is because any proposal
which passes, must have the concurrence of representatives whose
total votes exceeds the vote of the representative with the largest
vote by either 12.5 or 8.5 per cent depending on the subject matter
of the proposal.
8 2
A power structure based solely on the amount of financial con-
tribution presents several questions concerning the compatability
of such a structure with the objective of non-discriminatory access
announced in the preamble of the Interim Agreement. Among
such questions are the following: (1) Is such a power structure
necessary or desirable during the organizational and early oper-
ational stages of the system; (2) should such a power structure
be changed when the system outgrows its infancy; (3) if a
48. 1964 Interim Agreement art. V T.I.A.S. No. 5646.
49. Ibid.
50. See Simsarian, mipra note 44.
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change is considered desirable, should the change provide for
absolute equality of all member-states as to voting power, or
should it provide for a shift in the location of the greatest power
in the consortium according to some formula indicating the
change in importance of the members?
The allocation of power according to the financial quota sys-
tem is probably necessary in the earliest stages of the consortium,
but it cannot remain so in the future and should not be the
sole criterion utilized in the permanent agreement which must be
considered no later than 1969. 53 A system of absolute equality in
the voting power of all member countries probably should not be
adopted within the foreseeable future. Rather, changes in the
importance and ability of members should be reflected in the
degree of voting power and the right to receive benefits.
To initially provide that member-states of a communications
satellite system share equally in power and benefits would mean,
in all probability, that there would be nothing to share. At the
time of the organization of the consortium, the United States
had an enormous lead in technical and financial capability to
make such a system operational. The best way to make use of
such capabilities for the benefit of the international community
at large is to give the nation possessing such capabilities a strong
enough voice that it can provide leadership in a definite direction
and protect its financial investment. Such an arrangement is a
reasonable classification and is compatible with a goal of non-
discriminatory access only if: The arrangement is merely tempo-
rary; it is not permitted to survive the conditions which made it
necessary, and adequate protection against exploitation is placed
in the hands of other participants. The Interim Agreement ade-
quately meets these demands.
As conditions change, the power structure should also change.
The time will come when other participating states will develop
greater capabilities for making financial contributions. Their
quotas should be changed accordingly. However, there are other
changes, which may not occur simultaneously with a change in
financial capabilities, but which should also be reflected in
changes in voting power and the receipt of benefits. Such a
change is the increase or decrease in the actual traffic utilization
and the demand for such utilization by member-states. Clearly
such a change should be reflected in the so-called satellite utiliza-
tion quotas, i.e., the amount of use of the satellite which a mem-
53. 1964 Interim Agreement art. IX, T.I.A.S. No. 5646.
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ber may make through the ground station that services it. At
present satellite utilization quotas are heavily influenced by the
financial quotas. 4
The changes in traffic should be reflected by power changes
in other areas of activity in addition to satellite use. This is
particularly true with regard to areas of activity which affect
the ability of the system to meet new traffic demands. Such
areas would include the determination of whether new ground
stations should be permitted to utilize the system and the determi-
nation of rates for use of the space segment. Therefore, a new
formula, which takes account of the necessity for change in both
financial quotas and satellite utilization quotas, should be in-
cluded when a permanent agreement is drafted. The power
structure should not be in a constant state of flux, changing with
every shift in strength no matter how slight, but should be
periodically revised.
Does truly non-discriminatory participation require absolute
equality of voting power, i.e., a one member-one vote rule? While
sovereign nation-states might be theoretically equal, in fact they
are not. Rather than institutionally reflecting the theory of
absolute equality and letting the actual inequality work in an
under-the-table fashion, it is better to institutionally recognize
the actual inequality and provide safeguards, in order that all
can participate to some meaningful extent without exploitation
by any.
This article has recommended provisions for changes in the
consortium power structure partly because of the need to main-
tain internal consistency in the degree of participation with the
consortium's objective of non-discriminatory access. One other
possibility should be mentioned which, at this point, may largely
be regarded as pure conjecture. This possibility arises from the
fact that not only is non-discriminatory participation an an-
nounced goal of the consortium, but it is also the sentiment ex-
pressed in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1721
mentioned earlier.rY One could argue (and many would oppose
the argument) that the resolution is international law, or is
declaratory of international law, and that it constitutes a higher
level of abstraction in international law than is contained in the
Interim Agreement. Therefore, one might argue, that the devel-
oping principle of jus congens might require that the permanent
54. Article 8(b) (c), Special Agreement, T.I.A.S. No. 5646.
55. Res. 1721, Res. 1802, Res. 1962, mtpra note 45.
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agreement reflect changes in the power structure by taking into
account the greater contributions to and use of the communica-
tions satellite system by countries other than the dominant power.
Such an argument is based on a series of assumptions each one
of which is open to question.
Several areas of participation in the global communications
satellite system present uniquely difficult problems which are
not concerned primarily with the degree of participation but
rather with some of the complexities which face consortium
decision-makers because of the nature of the system. One of the
most delicate areas in which decisions must be made is that of the
selection of ground stations which will be permitted to utilize the
space segment.56 If for technical reasons only one ground station,
from an area including several countries, will be permitted to
use the space segment, the decision will have to be made as to
which country will receive the station. The various countries
contending for the honor of being the location of the site would
consider their international prestige seriously affected by an
adverse decision. In parts of the world where other means of
telecommunications have received scant development, a decision
in favor of one country as a ground site could well be a decision
making that country the dominant power in the area in com-
munications and perhaps in other matters as well. Because of the
great potential for abuse of the position of being the site of the
only ground station for several countries, a formal inspection
committee should be created in order to insure that the ground
station is providing non-discriminatory access to the system on
the part of the other countries which are supposed to be served
by the system. In order to prevent ground station site selection
from being a political football, technical criteria should play
as big a part as possible. To this end definite technical standards
should be required by the permanent agreement and should be
revised when necessary to take into account new technical de-
velopments. Under the present agreement no definite technical
standards need be used in reaching a decision.
57
IV. CoCc-usIoN
The consortium agreement is entitled: Agreement Establishing
Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications
56. See 1964 Special Agreement, suPra note 2 at art. 7 for the current selec-
tion system.
57. 1964 Special Agreement art. 7(a), T.I.A.S. No. 5646.
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Satellite System. The key word in this tongue twisting title is
Interim. If, as its name indicates, the arrangement is a mere way
station, a necessary first stop along the road toward orderly
international control of a new scientific means of utilizing a
necessarily sharable resource, then the agreement represents
genuine progress. If, on the other hand, the arrangement is
frozen permanently in its present form, it represents only an
illusion of progress that will cause widespread dissatisfaction
among the member-nations benefitting the least. This could re-
sult in a desertion from the ranks of the consortium, and the
factionalization of the global system into numerous small feudal
arrangements. Such a chaotic situation would make the efficient
use of the radio-telephone frequency spectrum impossible.
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